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11. Introduction
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) has developed a new policy that will
require particular classes of foreign banks operating in New Zealand to incorporate
locally rather than operating through a branch structure.  This policy will change the
institutional structure of New Zealand banking, and thus has the potential to have a
material impact on the efficiency and stability of our financial system.
WestpacTrust, New Zealand’s largest retail bank with assets of around $18.5 billion,
will be directly affected by this new policy.  Westpac Banking Corporation’s New
Zealand business,1 including the retail operations of WestpacTrust, is currently
conducted through branches of the Australian bank.2  WestpacTrust is a brand utilised
by Westpac Banking Corporation for its retail branches in New Zealand and is not
incorporated in New Zealand.  All New Zealand assets and liabilities associated with
the retail business of WestpacTrust are assets and liabilities of Westpac Banking
Corporation of Australia.
The RBNZ’s new policy on local incorporation will also affect the New Zealand
business of AMP Bank, which is currently conducted though a locally-incorporated
entity, and will remove the option for other banks to choose to give up local
incorporation in New Zealand if they consider it optimal to do so.   We understand that
until the announcement of this new RBNZ policy two other Australian banks have been
considering moving their New Zealand operations to a branch basis by giving up local
incorporation.
In this study we analyse the objectives underlying the Reserve Bank’s policy of
mandatory local incorporation and provide an assessment of the effectiveness of the
policy in meeting these objectives.  We review both the legal and regulatory framework
within which branches of foreign banks now operate in New Zealand, and we review
                                                
1 Westpac Banking Corporation’s New Zealand operations account for over 15 per cent of total group
assets and generate approximately 18 per cent of group profit.
2the international literature on the costs, benefits and efficiency tradeoffs associated with
a policy of mandatory local incorporation.  We consider the consistency of mandatory
local incorporation with the Reserve BankÕs current approach to the regulation of
financial institutions and we show that the governance structure that is imposed on New
Zealand banks by mandatory local incorporation is likely to reduce the efficiency of
their operations.  Finally, we examine a number of approaches that may meet the
current concerns of the RBNZ at lower cost than a policy of mandatory local
incorporation.
2. Reserve Bank Policy on Local Incorporation
2.1 Statement of the New Policy on Local Incorporation
Historically, foreign banks operating in New Zealand could choose to incorporate
locally or to operate as a branch of the parent bank.  On 27 September 2000, the RBNZ
announced its intention to seek legislation that would require banks in the following
categories to establish a locally incorporated subsidiary for their New Zealand
operations:
•  Systemically important banks – that is, New Zealand branches of foreign
banks large enough to materially affect the operation of the financial
sector as a whole
•  Foreign branches that take a significant level of retail deposits in New
Zealand and come from countries with legislation giving country
depositors a preferential claim in a winding up (which includes Australia
and the US)
•  Foreign branches that take a significant level of retail deposits in New
Zealand and which, in their home countries fail to publish the full
information depositors would need to assess financial soundness.
Banks not falling into one of these categories would continue to be able to choose
whether to operate as a branch or a subsidiary.
                                                                                                                                             
2 Westpac’s other New Zealand operations consist of institutional banking and payments system assets.
3The policy proposal of the RBNZ has subsequently been clarified in two respects.
First, it is proposed to set at $200 million the “significant level” of retail deposits at
which the requirement for local incorporation would be activated.  Second, after
initially indicating that policy would only apply to banks taking retail deposits, the
RBNZ has indicated that wholesale banks with New Zealand liabilities of $10 billion or
more would also be required to incorporate.
2.2 Rationale for the Policy
The rationale for the policy proposal set out in the 27 September 2000 RBNZ press
release is as follows:
“The new policy is intended to help the Reserve Bank manage a crisis
affecting a systemically important bank.  In a bank crisis the Bank can
appoint a statutory manager.  However, with a branch distinguishing the
New Zealand business from other parts of the operation may be difficult.
With a locally incorporated company it is clear which assets relate to
the New Zealand business.  This makes it easier to get a bank up and
running quickly, minimizing adverse effects on the financial sector and
economy.”
“The new policy will also help ensure that retail depositors can get the
information they need to assess the risk of dealing with a particular
bank, as locally incorporated banks are required to publish accounts
and other prudential information on a quarterly basis.”
“Also, local incorporation means that legislation in a bank’s home
country giving preference to depositors in the country would not apply
here in the event of a failure.”
4Carr (2001a: 14) extends the explanation for the policy in three ways.  First, he focuses
on the inadequacies of branch-based disclosure in a regulatory regime that is focused on
public disclosure and market discipline.  He states that “…in a world where assets can
be moved cross border quickly and at low cost … the branch balance sheet [is]
increasingly meaningless as a guide to assets and liabilities which were likely to exist at
a point of failure”.  Second, he notes that for a branch “the lack of local directors
militates against the incentive effects of the full force of legal sanctions” applicable to
actions that would be contrary to the interests of New Zealand depositors. Third, Carr
indicates that the RBNZ’s “… concerns about organizational form were aroused well
before our thinking on creditor recapitalisation as a means of resolving a failed bank
had been developed”.
The information currently posted on the RBNZ website indicates that increasing the
barriers to post-disclosure transfers of assets is a key rationale for the policy. The
RBNZ claims that:
“…there are no constraints on the transfer of assets between different
branches of the same legal entity.  Thus branch assets could have been
transferred overseas between the date of the last disclosure statement and
the date of failure, even if they clearly relate to the local branch.  With a
locally incorporated bank, the Companies Act provides some protection
from the transfer of assets out of the local bank in the period immediately
prior to the failure.”
This rationale for the new policy on local incorporation was stressed during a
discussion with RBNZ staff conducted as part of this study.
An independent report (Maier 2001) commissioned by the Reserve Bank provides
further information about the rationale for the policy change.  In Maier’s view “The
crux of the debate is not strictly about branch vs subsidiary structures, but more
importantly about the operation of international law across branch / subsidiary entities”
(2001: 2).  He found that:
5(i) Issues relating to the ownership and definition of assets exist with
both branch and subsidiary structures, but that “virtually all would be
more complicated in the branch scenario”.
(ii) “At the point of failure, the branch and subsidiary structures do not
have an identical impact in terms of the Reserve Bank objectives in
regard to capital adequacy.  The additional difficulties …thrown up
by the branch model may well prove material.  I doubt that additional
legal or financial structuring can completely overcome the
significance of these difficulties”.
(iii) The board of the parent bank would have a duty, and Australian law
might require, consideration of the interests of the bank as a whole in
any failure scenario, with the result that “it is likely to be New
Zealand law that is breached”.  In contrast a local board of a New
Zealand incorporated entity would have “unambiguous duties
…couched firmly within a settled body of New Zealand law”.
(iv) “…there is no simple way for the average New Zealand depositor to
evaluate the net impact of [the] various preference effects” associated
with the New Zealand branch of an Australian bank, whereas a local
subsidiary “…removes the preference effects…”
2.3 Interpretation of the RBNZ’s Rationale for the Local Incorporation Policy
In marked contrast to the usual approach of the RBNZ on major policy issues, there
appears to be no full-length paper on branch operations of international banks in New
Zealand that provides a careful articulation of the policy goals, the options, and the
proposed policy response.  In the absence of such a paper:
(i) The inconsistency in the explanations of the rationale for the policy as it has
been set out in the different press releases, speeches and communications of
the RBNZ serves to create confusion about the goals of the policy and
undermine the market’s confidence that the policy has a clear and justifiable
rationale.
6(ii) It is not clear how the policy is related to or consistent with earlier RBNZ
policy on branch / subsidiary issues and current policy on financial sector
regulation more generally.
(iii) There is also no publicly available evidence that the RBNZ have considered
the international literature on the relative merits of branches and locally
incorporated entities.
(iv) There is no publicly available evidence that the RBNZ has undertaken an
analysis of the efficiency of the governance structure that they impose by
requiring local incorporation of banks given the operational environment
and prudential regime in place in New Zealand.
(v) There is no publicly available evidence that the RBNZ has undertaken a
substantive analysis of the efficiency tradeoffs that are associated with
mandatory local incorporation.3
The focus of the public statements of the RBNZ on optimal management of an
insolvent institution, and the absence of a broader consideration of the efficiency of
mandatory local incorporation is the more surprising given the RBNZ’s broader
mandate for the soundness and efficiency of the New Zealand financial system.  The
independent review commissioned from Maier (2001) by the RBNZ does not provide
the comprehensive analysis of the issues and the tradeoffs that is required to fill this
gap.
3. Systemic Risk and Financial System Stability
The Reserve Bank’s policy will require foreign branches which fall under the definition
of a systemically-important bank to incorporate locally.  A systemically important bank
is defined as one whose liabilities in New Zealand (net of amounts to related parties)
exceed $10 billion.  From this it might appear reasonable to conclude that branch banks
pose particular systemic risks to the New Zealand financial system.  On closer
inspection, however, such a conclusion is difficult to support.
7Risk in the banking system flows from the way in which the banking system creates
demand liabilities and facilitates payments on the basis of a portfolio of loans and other
assets that cannot be liquidated at their face value over a short time frame.  Though
much of the historical literature has focused on bank runs by retail depositors, bank
regulators now recognize that the most critical issue is risk concentrated in wholesale
markets and on the large value transfers through the payments system associated with
the settlement of wholesale market transactions.  Systemic risk flows from the failure of
one bank owing large sums to other banks in the wholesale market, and from the
potential for other banks to fail as a result of their inability to obtain payments from the
failed bank.
Following recognition of the magnitude of the risks associated with the traditional
overnight settlement processes operating in New Zealand, and based on the view that
“payment system risk can be eliminated by the adoption of real-time clearing and
settlement arrangements” (Tait 1992: 201), the RBNZ put substantial effort into the
development of a real time gross settlement (RTGS) system. While the claim that
payments system risk has been eliminated as a result is clearly untenable, the Reserve
Bank’s own work concludes that the introduction of RTGS with liquidity provided by
the RBNZ on a fully-secured basis has substantially reduced systemic risk associated
with the payments system (White 1998; Hampton 1999).  This reduction in risk has
been enhanced by the voluntary interbank deposit agreements in New Zealand and
Australia aimed at providing mutual support to an individual bank during a liquidity
crisis.  Risks remain in respect of retail payments that continue to pass through delayed
settlement systems, but the volume of these payments is sufficiently small that
problems in settlement per se are unlikely to threaten systemic stability.
The RBNZ literature on the local incorporation issue fails to explain why, given these
improvements to the operation of the payments system, it is considered that branches of
                                                                                                                                             
3  In our discussions with them, RBNZ staff have indicated that they do not see an efficiency tradeoff
associated with the introduction of the policy.
8Australian banks pose more systemic risk than locally incorporated subsidiaries of
those banks.  Moreover, nothing in the RBNZ literature explains why branches of
foreign banks are considered to pose a threat to systemic stability in New Zealand when
other countries, such as the US, Australia and Canada take a different view.  These
countries place no upper limit on the scale of the business that may be undertaken by
branch banks operating in their jurisdictions so long as those branches do not take retail
deposits. If the answer to this puzzle is that the RBNZ’s concerns about the operation of
branches is driven by the fact that New Zealand’s largest retail bank is a branch rather
than a locally incorporated entity, then this suggests that, despite the emphasis on
systemic importance in RBNZ statements, the policy is actually driven by concerns
about depositor protection.  In this case, systemic importance is just a measure of the
potential scale of the possible loss to depositors in the event of a bank failure: that is,
systemic stability may be threatened by large losses to a large number of depositors.
The next section addresses the issue of depositor protection and considers whether local
incorporation is likely to enhance the position of New Zealand depositors.
4. Failure Scenarios and Protection of Depositors
Where Australian banks operate retail branches in New Zealand the claims of
depositors in the event of the insolvency of a bank may be affected by Australian law
and the actions of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) as well as by
New Zealand law and the operations of the RBNZ.  In this section we provide a brief
review of the relevant legal and regulatory issues.  Our analysis suggests that while
legislation in Australia does raise some issues that require consideration by the RBNZ,
any policy response must be conceptually and operationally consistent with the
approach to prudential supervision adopted in New Zealand, specifically the focus of
our regime on disclosure and market discipline rather than depositor protection.
4.1 Depositor Preference Arrangements Under Australian and New Zealand Law
Division 2 of the Banking Act (Cth) 1959 deals with the protection of depositors.
Section 12 of the Act states that “It is the duty of APRA to exercise its powers and
9functions under this Division for the protection of the depositors of the several ADI’s”.
Section 13A of the Act deals with the consequences of the inability or failure of an ADI
to meet its obligations.  Specifically, sub-section 13A(3) states that “If an ADI becomes
unable to meet its obligations or suspends payment, the assets of the ADI in Australia
are to be available to meet that ADI’s deposit liabilities in Australia in priority to all
other liabilities of the ADI”.  The ordinary interpretation of this provision is that, in the
event of the insolvency of the Australian bank, depositors at New Zealand branches of
the bank will rank behind Australian depositors in claims against the Australian assets.4
The preference for Australian depositors, and the obligations placed upon APRA under
the Banking Act are a mechanism for depositor protection that falls short of the more
comprehensive protection that would be available under a formal deposit insurance
scheme.  However, where a formal taxpayer-funded or taxpayer-supported deposit
insurance scheme was established, the actions of the APRA would be similar, with
obligations to act to minimise the liabilities of the taxpayer in respect of the deposit
insurance scheme.
The Westpac Banking Corporation Act 1982 (New Zealand) provides for similar
preferential treatment for New Zealand depositors in relation to claims on the New
Zealand assets of the foreign bank.  Section 23(2)) of the Act states that “In the event of
the Continuing Bank becoming unable to meet its obligations or suspending payment,
the assets of the Continuing Bank in New Zealand shall be available to meet the
Continuing Bank’s deposit liabilities in New Zealand in priority to all other liabilities of
the Continuing Bank”.  The Continuing Bank refers to the Westpac Banking
Corporation.  The ordinary interpretation of this provision is that New Zealand
depositors will rank ahead of Australian depositors in claims over the New Zealand
assets of Westpac Banking Corporation.
In the case of a failure of a locally incorporated bank in New Zealand, the Reserve
Bank, acting as the statutory manager, has the power to take control of all of the assets
                                                
4 The depositor protection provisions in the Banking Act have not been tested in the courts to date.
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and liabilities on the bank’s balance sheet.  In the case of a failed foreign branch, the
branch, not being a separate legal entity, has no balance sheet of its own and therefore
legally holds no assets.  All of the assets of the foreign bank located in New Zealand
are ultimately owned by the parent company.  The Act deals with this problem by
defining the relevant assets in terms of the assets of the Continuing Bank in New
Zealand, as opposed to assets owned by the foreign branch.  Under section 23(2) the
statutory manager would need to identify the assets of the bank in New Zealand.  There
is no difficulty with physical assets such as branch property and chattels which will fall
within the definition of assets in NZ if they are physically located in New Zealand.  The
difficulty is in respect of financial assets which may be associated with the New
Zealand business but whose physical location may be disputed.
Our interpretation of the implications of these statutes and regulatory policies is as
follows:
1. APRA’s primary responsibility is the protection of Australian depositors.  In the
event of the insolvency of a bank, the Australian Banking Act gives Australian
depositors a first claim over the foreign assets generated by an Australian
bank’s branches including those generated by its retail operations in New
Zealand.
2. New Zealand legislation provides a countervailing preference for New Zealand
depositors over the New Zealand assets of the branches of Australian banks.
3. APRA calculates the risk-adjusted capital requirements imposed upon Westpac
with a view only to securing deposits in Australia.  It views capital associated
with the New Zealand branches of Westpac as alienated to secure New Zealand
creditors under the New Zealand legislation.
Under these legislative provisions, the issues for the RBNZ in its role as financial
regulator appear to be fourfold.  First, it is not clear that New Zealand depositors
understand the legal status of their claims on Westpac, and if they do not, it is not clear
how the regulator should respond.  Second, there is the question of whether, in certain
failure scenarios, the claims of New Zealand depositors would have more or less
11
security if they were claims on a locally incorporated subsidiary.  Third, there is the
question of post-disclosure asset-shifting.  Since this can only be a threat to New
Zealand depositors when the transfers occur at less than fair value, it is effectively the
threat of looting the New Zealand branches of the bank by the Australian directors or
management.  Third, there is the question of the legal certainty of the jurisdiction in
which assets would fall if a bank became insolvent, and the issue of whether local
incorporation changes this.
4.2 Depositor Protection and RBNZ Policy on Bank Regulation
Under the RBNZ policy, foreign banks that have retail deposits in excess of $200
million will be required to incorporate where legislation in the bank’s home country
gives local depositors or creditors a preferential claim in liquidation over bank assets
located in the home country or where there is inadequate disclosure in the home
country.  Our view is that the proposed policy is illogical and inconsistent with current
regulatory policy in New Zealand in three respects.
1. The rationale for the policy in the case of preferential treatment is that it is
currently very difficult for New Zealand depositors to assess their likely
position in a winding up.  The Reserve Bank’s proposed policy will not go
to rectifying this problem.  No retail depositor is able to make a precise
assessment of their likely position in the event of the winding up of a bank.
Retail depositors undertake a much more general assessment of the safety of
their investments, including assessments of sunk investment in brand
recognition and major legal issues such as the preference for depositors in
Australia.
Consistency with the RBNZ’s stated policy on regulation – market
discipline rather than protection of depositors – would be provided simply
by a requirement that Westpac make the New Zealand public aware that
under Australian law they are unsecured creditors of WestpacTrust.  The
reaction of depositors to information about their true position would provide
12
Westpac with a tangible basis on which to balance the costs associated with
any consumer unease and loss of custom with the costs associated with local
incorporation.  In other words, with full information, the market mechanism
is capable of effectively dealing with the issue of foreign bank
organizational form in a more efficient manner than the imposition of
restrictive policy, even where there is preferential treatment of home country
depositors.
2. Secondly, if depositors are unable to make an assessment about their likely
position in the event the foreign bank in whose branch they have placed
their deposit is wound up, and the Reserve Bank is concerned with depositor
protection, it is not clear why it is appropriate to allow depositors in banks
with retail deposits of less than $200 million go on being unable to such an
assessment.  In Australia, the US and Canada the prohibition on foreign
branches taking retail deposits applies absolutely, regardless of the level of
retail deposits and the home country position.  Given that the objective of
the policy in these countries is to provide protection to all local depositors, a
threshold is not justified.  In this way, the Reserve Bank policy is internally
inconsistent and does not afford equal treatment to New Zealand depositors.
3. The threshold under which New Zealand retail banks will not be forced to
locally incorporate is justified by the RBNZ on a number of grounds that
appear to go to at least partial recognition of significant costs associated
with local incorporation.  Among the justifications given by the Reserve
Bank for the threshold is that it will allow branch banks to accept retail
deposits as an adjunct to their wholesale business (staff deposits, small
deposits from corporates etc) without being in technical breach of
requirements.5  It will also allow a bank to explore retail deposit taking on a
                                                
5 Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Memorandum to the Treasurer on Proposed Changes to Policy on Bank
Organisational Form, 27 January 2000, page 2.
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small scale without having to incorporate locally.6  With this justification for
the threshold, the Reserve Bank appears to be conceding within the design
of its policy that compelling local incorporation is associated with
significant costs that may have the impact of reducing the level of retail
activity in the New Zealand banking system. It is not clear whether some
type of cost benefit analysis has been undertaken by the Reserve Bank in
determining the level of the threshold or whether it has been determined
arbitrarily.  If the Reserve Bank has specific concerns that justify the
imposition of a threshold then these concerns should be made explicit.
4.3       The Trade-Off Between Regulation for Solvency and Regulation to Address
Insolvency
According to the RBNZ, the overall objective of bank registration and supervision
policies in New Zealand is to enhance the soundness and efficiency of the financial
system, not to protect depositors or individual banks.7  This objective highlights a key
deficiency in the Reserve Bank’s proposed policy, its failure to distinguish between the
questions:
(i) What is the optimal structure for the management of an insolvent
institution? and
(ii) What is the optimal structure for the overall stability and efficiency
of the New Zealand financial system?
The focus of the Reserve Bank in the formulation of the policy is most clearly
illustrated by Maier (2001: 2), who states explicitly that his
…frame of reference in almost all cases was what would happen in
practice in the very short period of response time surrounding a failure
event.  In other words, based on present knowledge, and faced with a
defined failure of systemic consequence, how would Reserve Bank /
                                                
6  Ibid.
7 Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Memorandum to the Treasurer, 27 January 2000, page 1.
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Statutory Management activities be materially enabled or curtailed in
either a branch or subsidiary context?
Again, in respect of capital adequacy, Maier (2002: 3) notes that his approach was
 “to focus solely on the ability of a New Zealand statutory manager to quickly,
efficiently and effectively take control of hard assets (with minimum risk of
successful countervailing legal claims) that could be used to reopen a failed
bank”.
These statements indicate that Mr Maier has focused his analysis exclusively on
optimal failure management at the expense of analyzing the impact of organizational
form on the soundness and efficiency of the financial system.
As discussed in section 3, the potential for losses to depositors of sufficient scale may
act to destabilize the banking system. The development of more certain legal
parameters governing failure management will not act to eliminate the prospect of
depositor losses in the event of bank failure. Therefore, it is critical to ensure that
policies targeted at failure management do not have the effect of compromising
systemic stability.  If it is the case that policies designed to provide for the effective
management of an insolvent institution are neutral with respect to the efficiency of the
financial system and the likelihood of insolvency, then there is no efficiency tradeoff
that need be considered in the implementation of those policies.  If, however, policies
designed to provide for the effective management of failure either increase the
likelihood that a New Zealand bank will become insolvent, or reduce the efficiency of
the operations of the New Zealand banks, then the policy development process must
include an explicit analysis of the relevant efficiency tradeoffs. Maier (2001: 2) notes
the existence of some tradeoff with respect to the Reserve Bank’s proposed policy on
local incorporation “…it is more than arguable that branch structures could prove
more useful in avoiding failures, while subsidiary structures could be more useful in
managing the failure process”.
15
Regulation that effectively promotes the solvency of financial institutions is particularly
important in the New Zealand context.  New Zealand is a small, open and relatively
undiversified economy.  New Zealand financial institutions that have a high degree of
exposure to the New Zealand economy are more likely to be severely affected by a
specific exogenous shock compared to a more diversified economy. It is significant that
each of the financial institution failures affecting the New Zealand financial system,
including the BNZ (in the 1890s and the 1980s) and the DFC, have involved locally-
incorporated institutions with a high exposure to New Zealand economy.  A foreign
bank branch in New Zealand, being an integral part of the parent bank, derives benefits
from being a part of a more diversified portfolio of risk.  A local subsidiary is a
separate legal entity, operating on the strength of its own balance sheet would find it
more difficult to achieve a similar level of diversification.
The converse of this, of course, is that a foreign branch in New Zealand is exposed to
out-of-country risks compared to a locally incorporated entity.  White (1992:182-3)
notes that:
In the case of overseas applicants, the Bank does not insist on a registered bank
being incorporated in New Zealand, ie. it will register a branch of an overseas
bank.  From the Reserve Bank’s stand point, in one respect, this is a preferred
ownership structure for an overseas based bank.  Where an overseas bank
operates in New Zealand as a branch of the global bank, the overseas bank is
directly liable for all the obligations incurred by its branch in New Zealand.  It
is also a structure preferred by some overseas banks, since it enables them to
trade in New Zealand on the strength of their global balance sheet, rather than
on just the financial resources of the bank in New Zealand.  On the other hand,
it needs to be recognised that the New Zealand branch of a foreign bank is
directly exposed to, and fully shares in, any problems encountered by the bank
wherever in the world they may arise.  For this reason, when an overseas bank
applies to be registered as a branch in New Zealand, the Reserve Bank has
regard to the international standing of the overseas bank and to the nature and
16
scope of the supervision of that bank as conducted by the overseas banking
supervisor.
White’s view is that while foreign banks do expose New Zealand to some out-of-
country risks, this risk is mitigated where those banks are adequately supervised.
A more recent RBNZ study (Hull 2002) considers only the costs and benefits of foreign
ownership and does not explicitly address the costs and benefits of local incorporation
and branch operations of foreign banks.  She does, however, note that in the case of a
New Zealand-specific economic shock New Zealand is “unambiguously better off” as a
result of having foreign-owned banks (2002: 29).
The US Treasury/Federal Reserve study (1992) that looked specifically at the issue of
whether a subsidiary requirement would enhance the safety and soundness of the US
banking system. The Review defined safety and soundness as the extent to which
depositors and creditors can be assured that a bank is being operated in a manner that
does not expose them to undue risk of loss.8  The argument that a subsidiary
requirement would enhance financial stability was rejected by the Review on the basis
that “…more appropriate and effective measures are available for the purposes of
protecting safety and soundness.” Such measures included “…the promotion of
adequate supervisory standards worldwide and the right to prohibit access to the US
market by banks that are not adequately supervised.”  Interestingly, the Review found
that there are no significant differences between a branch and a locally incorporated
subsidiary with respect to compliance with the law.
The study concluded that, given the experience to date the operations of foreign banks
can be operated safely under either organizational form: “Although, there are
theoretical advantages and disadvantages with respect to safety and soundness
considerations under the two forms of organization, these distinctions are primarily
associated with differences in the way the two forms of organization operate and do not
                                                
8  Appendix C, page 4.
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support a conclusion that one form is inherently more safe and sound than the other.”
[Appendix C, page 12]
Similarly, in relaxing restrictions on foreign bank organizational form in Canada, the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions concluded that the safety and soundness of the
Canadian financial system would not be compromised under foreign branching.
From a supervisory perspective, foreign bank branches have some advantages.  They
are less likely to engage in connected lending; they are subject to additional oversight
by foreign supervisors on a consolidated basis with the parent under the terms of the
Basel Concordat; they are more likely to obtain financial support from the
headquarters; and they may be subject to more rigorous accounting disclosure and
reporting requirements (Hawkins and Mihaljek 2001: 29).
Many Asian supervisory authorities note that branches have the advantage of being
backed by the full strength of their parent institution, including financial resources,
supervision and information technology.  They also point out that, under the proposed
Capital Accord, branches incorporated in less risky countries will be able to obtain
cheaper funds because they will be subject to lower capital weights, whereas
subsidiaries will be covered by the ratings of their host country (Hawkins and Mihaljek
2001: 30).
Countries that favour subsidiaries stress their ability to better regulate, supervise and
“ring-fence” subsidiaries in periods of distress.  Branches are more difficult to sell to
third parties when problems arise. The countries concerned point out the widespread
practice of restricting the operations of branches as a major weakness of branches from
a supervisory perspective (Hawkins and Mihaljek 2001: 30).
In case of branch failure, however, foreign creditors would generally have an advantage
over domestic creditors.  Local subsidiaries of international banks are stand alone
entities with their own capital, and are supervised on a consolidated basis by the
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parent’s supervisory authority only when the subsidiary is part of a holding company or
a universal bank.  Nonetheless, reputable international banks closely monitor the
activities of their subsidiaries so as to preserve the parent’s good name and solid
standing. (Hawkins and Mihaljek 2001: 29).
4.4       Local Incorporation and Depositor Protection
In what circumstances would local incorporation provide greater protection to
depositors in New Zealand?  To consider this question it is helpful to frame the range of
plausible failure scenarios.
In the event that Westpac fails, but the assets of the New Zealand branches are
sufficient to cover New Zealand deposit liabilities, then the Westpac Banking
Corporation Act (1982) should ensure that the assets of the New Zealand branches are
available to secure New Zealand depositors.  Only if local incorporation provided more
legal certainty about the ring-fencing of the New Zealand assets would local
incorporation provide any advantages to New Zealand depositors.  The materiality of
the RBNZ’s concerns about the legal uncertainty associated with the domicile of assets
under the Westpac Banking Corporation Act 1982 is difficult to assess, and the RBNZ
has not made public any substantive legal analysis of the issue.  Consequently, there is
also no publicly available evidence that this uncertainty would be materially reduced by
local incorporation.
An alternative scenario is that through depreciation of asset values in New Zealand the
New Zealand business of Westpac effectively becomes insolvent but the global bank,
while stressed, remains solvent.  In this case the subsidiary may be allowed to fail in
two circumstances.  First, if the financial position of Westpac constrained it from
raising new capital it would not be able to bailout its foreign subsidiary.  This is
because APRA would require that Westpac raise more capital to maintain its capital
requirements based on risk-weighted assets of the group, and would not support any
transfer of existing capital to the subsidiary. In such a scenario, the New Zealand
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subsidiary would be allowed to fail. Second, the foreign bank parent may consider that
it is in the interests of group as a whole that the subsidiary be allowed to fail and may
therefore utilize its limited liability (the absence of a legal guarantee of the liabilities to
New Zealand depositors) to walk away from the subsidiary. That this approach is
feasible is demonstrated by the fact that it was the stance taken by Air New Zealand in
the insolvency of Ansett. Whether the decision to allow the subsidiary to fail is
effectively made by the bank or its home jurisdiction regulator, New Zealand depositors
are materially worse off under this scenario. In both cases a branch structure would
make it much more difficult for the liabilities of the New Zealand branch not to be paid
while Westpac Banking Corporation remained solvent.
In our view, considerable weight should be placed on the benefits that depositors
receive from the legal liability of the parent bank for the payment of the deposits of the
branches in New Zealand.  Operation through a branch may be taken as a signal of
commitment to its New Zealand operations by the parent bank given the legal liability
is assumes for all aspects of the operations in New Zealand.  Local incorporation might,
conversely, be advantageous only as a means of limiting liability for the New Zealand
operations, and thus provides a signal that the parent bank may consider walking away
from any the local subsidiary if it should fail.  Even just from the point of view of this
signaling mechanism, depositors might rationally prefer to deal with a branch of a
foreign bank.
In the event that Westpac becomes insolvent and the assets of the New Zealand
branches are also below the value of New Zealand liabilities, then no advantage arises
from local incorporation except in respect of its ability to resolve legal uncertainty.
Finally, we consider the possibility that under any of the above scenarios where the
assets available to pay New Zealand depositors are insufficient to meet claims, the
RBNZ responds by implementing its “haircut” policy (a write-down of the value of
claims that allows the bank to re-open).  In this situation, local incorporation is, once
again, only valuable if it provides any reduction in legal uncertainty.  The principle
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challenges with the operation of a New Zealand retail bank under statutory
management are likely to be operational (given the extent of systems integration for the
New Zealand and Australian operations of the Australian banks) and this will not be
resolved by local incorporation per se.
There is no publicly-available evidence that the RBNZ has undertaken any careful
analysis of the likelihood of these different scenarios, or of the tradeoffs between
regulation focused on ensuring solvency and regulation focused on management in the
event of insolvency.  Consequently, it is not clear that the RBNZ has undertaken the
analysis required to consider whether the policy of local incorporation has net benefits
for New Zealand depositors.  Our analysis raises serious doubts that such an analysis
would support the RBNZ’s new policy on local incorporation.
4.5 Looting
Throughout the RBNZ statements on the problems created by operation in New
Zealand through branches there is reference to the greater ease with which it would be
possible for a bank on the verge of insolvency to undertake post-disclosure statement
asset shifting.9  We begin by noting first that only if the asset transfers take place at less
than fair value would this activity be of concern to New Zealand depositors or
regulators, and second that if asset transfers take place at less than fair value this
amounts to the looting (as this term is used by Akerlof and Romer 1993) of the local
operations of the bank by the parent.
One scenario suggested to us is that on the eve of the failure of a bank, the Australian
parliament could pass legislation that would effectively endorse looting of the foreign
subsidiaries and branches of the bank in the interests of maximising the assets available
to secure Westpac depositors in Australia.  This would not, however, change the
legality of the looting in those foreign jurisdictions in which the bank operated.  Thus
                                                
9  We delay until section 5 below consideration of the possibility that the potential for looting is reduced
by the existence of independent local directors.
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even with Australian government endorsement, the directors of the Australian bank
would face legal action in New Zealand should they undertake such activities.
While it is possible that in these circumstances the directors could avoid legal action
(by not travelling to New Zealand), it is unlikely that they or the bank would be
ambivalent about the potential for such action.  No bank that wishes to operate outside
its home jurisdiction can have as directors or senior managers individuals with
outstanding criminal charges against them.  In addition, it seems to use most unlikely
that the Australian government would condone actions that were illegal in other
countries, even on the verge of a crisis in their domestic banking system.  We therefore
think that the likelihood of any purposive action to loot the branches of a New Zealand
bank is remote, and that the focus of the RBNZ on post-disclosure asset-shifting is
misplaced.
5. Governance: The Benefits and Costs of a Local Board
Mandatory local incorporation provides for legal separation of the governance structure
of the New Zealand operations of Australian banks from the governance structure for
the banks as a whole.  In this section we consider the RBNZ’s rationale for this policy
before developing a more general analysis of its efficiency.
5.1 The RBNZ’s Analysis of the Benefits of a Separate Governance Structure
In the RBNZ’s discussions of its local incorporation policy much emphasis has been
placed on the key role of the local board of directors.  As Griffin (2001: 12) put it:
It would be very difficult to achieve almost all of the objectives we
are trying to achieve without local incorporation.  This is
primarily because a branch does not have its own board with
responsibility  for looking after the interests of the New Zealand
operation.  We can impose various duties on the bank as a whole
and on the bank’s directors but whenever those duties conflict with
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the interests of the bank as a whole the interests of the bank as a
whole would take precedence over those of the branch.
Under New Zealand Corporations Law the local Board has obligations to act in the
interests of the local entity and increased disclosure requirements.  In addition, banks
incorporated in New Zealand are subject to a condition of registration by the RBNZ
that the Bank’s constitution “…does not allow the bank’s directors to act in the
interests of a holding company where to do so would conflict with the interests of the
bank, to the detriment of creditors  (Griffin 1998: 248).  The Reserve Bank views such
an obligation as having the effect of more closely aligning the interests of the local
board with those of the Reserve Bank and more broadly the interests of New Zealand
depositors.
The RBNZ places considerable emphasis on the obligations of local directors under the
disclosure framework applicable to locally incorporated banks.  As Brash (2001: 5) puts
it:
Each director is required to sign and make certain attestations in the
disclosure statements including:
·  Whether the bank is complying with the prudential requirements
imposed on it by the Reserve Bank;
·  Whether the bank has systems in place to adequately monitor and
control its banking risks and whether those systems are being
properly applied;
·  Whether the bank’s exposure to connected parties is contrary to the
interests of the bank; and
·  Whether the disclosure statement contains all the required
disclosures and is not false or misleading.
Directors face potentially severe criminal penalties and civil liability
where a disclosure statement is held to be false or misleading.
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Complementing the disclosure requirements, banks incorporated in New Zealand are
required to have a minimum of two independent directors (who must also be
independent of any parent company) and a non-executive chairman.  These
requirements are intended to increase the board’s capacity to scrutinise the performance
of the management team.  In addition, independent directors provide some assurance
that the bank’s dealings with its parent or other related parties are not in conflict with
the interests of the bank in New Zealand. (Brash 2001: 5)
The published analysis of the RBNZ places great weight on the benefits of a local board
but provides no indication that it has considered the substantial costs arising from the
imposition of an independent governance structure on the New Zealand business of the
Australian banks.  Moreover, there is no publicly available evidence that the Reserve
Bank has considered the extensive economics literature on governance issues which is
directly relevant to an assessment of the costs and benefits of their policy.  If the RBNZ
is going to claim that governance and accountability issues are material, it must take
seriously the economics literature on these issues.
In our view local incorporation will reduce the efficiency of the governance and
accountability structures by:
·  Increasing the complexity of the principal-agent relationships
associated with the governance structure of the bank;
·  Requiring the appointment of outside directors who do not have a
financial investment in the local entity (though they may own shares
in the global entity);
·  Imposing a governance structure that is inconsistent with the
efficient operational structure of the New Zealand operations of
Australian banks.
Any consideration of the benefits derived from a local board must be accompanied by
an assessment of the efficiency implications in terms of the potential costs imposed
upon the New Zealand operations of Australian banks.
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5.2 Principal-Agent Relationships: The Separation of Ownership and Control
The Reserve Bank considers it desirable that the local board will be required to act in
the best interests of the local entity.  The Reserve Bank views such an obligation as
more closely aligning the interests of bank directors with the interests of the New
Zealand regulator and / or New Zealand creditors.  Specifically, it considers that the
existence of a New Zealand board may in certain circumstances be helpful in
preventing strategic movements of assets specifically designed to disadvantage the New
Zealand bank (and hence New Zealand depositors).  This is because the New Zealand
board would, in the RBNZ’s view, be bound by the constitution of the local entity and
have fiduciary obligations to the local entity rather than to the Australian bank.
If WestpacTrust NZ Ltd is a wholly owned subsidiary of Westpac Banking
Corporation, the local directors will either not own shares in the local institution or will
have shares in the local institution for which there is no outside market.  In practice
they will therefore have much in common with directors of State Owned Enterprises:
they will have liability for the accuracy of the attestations that they sign, but they will
not have personal wealth directly at stake in the performance of the New Zealand
entity.  Liability has a significant incentive effects, but it is diluted by the uncertainty
associated with the outcomes of legal processes, and the range of viable defenses that
they may mounted by the director of an insolvent institution.  Liability is thus not a
substitute for having personal wealth at stake in the performance of the New Zealand
entity where the market directly assesses the performance of the local institution
separate from the parent bank.
If the New Zealand directors of WestpacTrust NZ Ltd have substantial investments in
the shares of Westpac Banking Corporation, then the incentives claimed by the Reserve
Bank will be complicated.  New Zealand directors with investments in Westpac
Banking Corporation will have incentives based on their personal investments to
promote the interests of the global banking entity, and these will reinforce the
incentives associated with their obligations to the global entity as owner of the local
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bank.  How these will weight against the potential liability in the even of the failure of
the bank is far from clear.  What is clear is that the incentives of the local directors may
not be materially different from the incentives of the Australian directors who currently
provide the attestations required by the RBNZ.  We therefore consider Mr Maier’s
statement that a local board “…precisely identifies responsible individuals and gives
them unambiguous duties (with regard to the New Zealand bank)…” to be incorrect.
An important implication of conferring greater control on local management and
independent directors is the risk of over-diversification of the local entity relative to
that which is optimal.  Local management will be driven to a certain extent by the risk
associated with (regulatory and owner) assessment of their performance which may
lead to sub-optimal outcomes for the bank.  It is well established that investors manage
risk more effectively than managers manage risk associated with the performance of the
activities they undertake for the firm.
The separation of ownership and control under mandatory local incorporation can also
have the effect of distorting the financing decisions of the local subsidiary.  In practice
there is evidence (see Faccio et al 2000 and La Porta et al 2000) that principal-agent
problems may translate into an insistence on the part of the owner that the subsidiary
pay higher dividends (retain a lower proportion of earnings) or impose a higher
debt/equity ratio to introduce market discipline for the subsidiary.  In the presence of
substantial regulatory constraints these policies may not be easily implemented,
suggesting that high transactions costs may be associated with the owner’s optimal
response to the governance structure imposed by regulation.
The RBNZ’s local incorporation policy has the effect of giving local managers and
independent directors greater control of the New Zealand operations at the expense of
the beneficial owner of the company (Westpac Banking Corporation).  In combination
with the requirements for independent directors and attestations on certain matters, the
practical impact of local incorporation is therefore to drive a substantial wedge between
ownership and control of the New Zealand subsidiary.  This will have the effect of
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magnifying the principal-agent problems where the interests of a company’s
management and owners diverge (Fama and Jensen 1983).  Any welfare improvements
associated with a shift in control to a local board in the event of the insolvency of the
parent bank may well be small by comparison with the ongoing welfare losses
(including increased systemic risk) associated with the enhancement of the separation
of ownership and control across all aspects of the bank’s operations.
5.3 Principal Agent Relationships #2: Agents with Two Principals
The literature on corporate governance assumes that managers and directors are agents
of the shareholders, and that the fundamental problem of corporate governance is the
need to align the incentives of these different groups.  Where regulations require the
creation of a local board that would not otherwise have been established, the
governance structure departs from the private optimum and may therefore involve some
reduction in efficiency. In the case of the requirements imposed on the local board in
New Zealand, however, the distortion to the private model of governance goes much
further. The attestations required of directors of banks operating in New Zealand mean
that in this capacity at least the directors owe a primary duty to the RBNZ and to the
creditors of the bank rather than the owners of the bank.  In the absence of substantial
operating autonomy from the parent bank, it is unlikely that the RBNZ requirement for
a local board is driven by a desire to strengthen oversight of these operational issues.
The directors of the bank incorporated in New Zealand are therefore best viewed as
“whistle-blowers” injected into the governance structure of the bank by the regulator.10
The practical effect of a governance structure of this type is to provide that directors
have two principals: the regulator and the shareholder.  The requirements of the
regulator therefore go well beyond the requirements for legally binding attestations:
they impose on the bank a governance structure which is required only in respect of the
regulatory regime, but which must be integrated into the governance structure of the
bank.  In this way the regulatory requirements are much more intrusive than they need
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be.  Setting aside any efficiency losses associated with the creation of an unnecessary
addition to the governance structure, the dual allegiance of these directors is likely to
result in a material reduction in the efficiency of decision-making and governance
within the organisation.
Governance problems may also arise from attempts by the management to treat local
directors as principals who can be “played off” against the owners of the bank.  Where
local management disagrees with policies set down by the shareholder, they may
attempt to enlist the support of the local directors in repudiating these policies.  Where
these local directors also have a quasi-official through recognition by or reports to the
financial sector regulator the scope for these challenges to policy from the head office
of the bank may be extended.  Ultimately the ability of management to enlist local
directors in support of their views is likely to lead to ineffective governance structures
and management capture of decision-making.
5.4 The Quality of Internal Controls and Accountability
The RBNZ has claimed that the disclosure requirements have increased the
accountability of bank directors and, indirectly, the accountability of various levels of
management within the banks (Brash 2001: 5). In claiming that local incorporation
provides superior accountability for actions that are consistent with the interests of New
Zealand depositors, the RBNZ appear to have in mind three potential weaknesses in the
accountability of directors of the Australian bank.  First, in circumstances where the
Bank was on the verge of insolvency directors of Westpac Banking Corporation would
take actions consistent with their fiduciary obligations to shareholders of the Bank even
if those were inconsistent with the interests of depositors in one jurisdiction such as
New Zealand.  Second, if contradictory legal obligations required directors of Westpac
Banking Corporation to make decisions that were illegal in one jurisdiction, then they
would make decisions that were consistent with Australian law.  Third, Australian
                                                                                                                                             
10 During their discussions with us as part of the research for this project, RBNZ staff used the term
“whistleblower” to describe the independent directors.
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directors will place little weight on their liability in New Zealand because of their
residence in another jurisdiction.
In our view, the accountability benefits of local incorporation are at best minimal.  The
Board of Directors of Westpac Banking Corporation currently has liability in respect of
the Bank’s disclosure statement to the RBNZ and the conduct of its business in New
Zealand in a manner consistent with RBNZ regulations.  The fact that they are resident
in Australia is unlikely to diminish the focus of any quality director on the liability that
they might face in New Zealand.  Westpac Banking Corporation could not be
ambivalent about a situation in which its directors faced criminal charges in New
Zealand.  Moreover, the Australian government is unlikely to resist extradition
proceedings against the directors or to support their continuation as directors of the
Bank in these circumstances.  Consequently, legal accountability of the directors may
not be materially improved by local incorporation.
Even if accountability is not improved, the exposure of the local directors to the risk of
personal liability may lead to an increase in the quality of internal controls and thus
reduce the risk of failure of the bank.  The claim from the RBNZ is that “there has been
quite a lot of anecdotal evidence that bank directors are now taking their responsibilities
more seriously, and there seems to have been a marked increase in the attention given
to internal controls” (Brash 2000: 84 – 85).
Directors of locally incorporated banks may respond to the incentives provided by
regulation by reallocating resources, but there should be no presumption that this
resource reallocation will actually provide for the quality of internal controls to be
improved.  Exposure to liability will no doubt cause local directors and management to
allocate more resources to tasks, systems and reporting requirements that will minimise
their personal risk of liability in the event of insolvency.  Note, however, that this
response will be driven by an interest in minimising personal liability: it is far from
clear that this will have any impact on the actual quality of internal controls or on the
probability of insolvency.
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Assuming that exposure of directors to personal liability will translate into improved
internal controls also represents an overly simplistic view of the relationship that would
exist in practice between the Australian bank and the New Zealand subsidiary.  The
attestations required from local directors implicitly assume a full management structure
and choice about the operations of the bank, but this choice does not exist in practice.
5.5 The (Mis)Alignment of Operations and Governance Structure
The information technology revolution in banking has provided vast scope for
specialization of functions and economies of scale in management.  The small scale of
the New Zealand market makes it highly inefficient to segregate Australian and New
Zealand operations in a range of areas.  As a result, all of the Australian banks have
reduced the range of management and “back-office” functions undertaken in New
Zealand introducing common systems in both Australia and New Zealand and
transferring management responsibility or those systems to Australia.
We consider the fact that two Australian banks were considering replicating the
WestpacTrust model by moving their New Zealand operations to a branch basis to be
strong a priori evidence that substantial costs can be avoided through operating within
a branch structure given the current organization of banking operations in New
Zealand.  The move to Australia of many functions formerly associated with a New
Zealand head office has increased the costs of maintaining a separately incorporated
entity in New Zealand, and made independent governance of New Zealand operations
impractical and inefficient.  The high level of competition in the New Zealand banking
market exerts discipline to ensure that these efficiency benefits are passed on to New
Zealand consumers.
One interpretation of the requirements for independent governance and management is
that the common systems that each bank operates between Australia and New Zealand
would at least be segregated so that the New Zealand business could be controlled by
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different staff and would create unique records in the system.  We understand, however,
that not all of the New Zealand-incorporated subsidiaries of the Australian banks
operate in this way.  If this is true, and operations in New Zealand are fully integrated
into systems and management decision structures that are based in and report to
Australia, we consider that there must be substantial doubts about the practical ability
of the governance structure in New Zealand to exercise the independence from the
Australian bank that the RBNZ appears to envisage.  Further, the stated aim of the
RBNZ to ensure that there is an entity in New Zealand that could be placed in statutory
management and operated as a bank under RBNZ direction may well be inconsistent
with current levels of integration of New Zealand operations with those of the
Australian banks.  It is therefore likely that if the RBNZ continues with its current
policy trajectory the costs of mandatory local incorporation will be amplified by the
costs of meeting minimum requirements for operational separation that may be
established by the RBNZ in the future.
In respect of internal risk management, for example, it is difficult to imagine that as a
practical matter the New Zealand directors of WestpacTrust NZ Ltd would exercise
independent choice over the fundamental models of portfolio and operational risk
management.  For example, we cannot imagine that the directors of WestpacTrust NZ
Ltd could force Westpac to change its global risk management practices, or
alternatively could contract with ANZ for the supply of risk management services
because they thought that the practices of ANZ were superior to those of Westpac.
Equally, we cannot imagine that it would be efficient for WestpacTrust NZ Ltd to
develop its own fundamental risk management systems, since the scale of the New
Zealand business is too small to support the cost of staffing and managing a unique
system.  Requiring New Zealand directors to sign attestations in respect of matters that
are (on grounds of efficiency) best decided, and as a practical matter necessarily
decided, in Sydney or Melbourne will primarily have the effect of reducing the quality
of the independent local directors that the banks are able to get to sign the attestations.
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5.6 Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that there are substantial efficiency losses associated with the
imposition of an independent governance structure on the New Zealand operations of
the Australian banks, including an increase in the systemic risk in the banking system.
These losses are associated with the enforced separation of ownership and control of
the subsidiary, the inconsistency of a separate governance structure with the efficient
organization of the business of the Australian banks in New Zealand, and the
inconsistency of the attestations required of independent directors with the business
structure of the Australian banks in New Zealand.  By comparison with these efficiency
losses, the efficiency gains associated with having attestations from New Zealand-
resident directors and from the establishment of fiduciary responsibilities to a distinct
New Zealand entity do not appear to be large.
6 Implications for Funding and the Use of Capital
In a world of zero transactions costs banks would be ambivalent about the cost of
establishing separate or segregated systems for subsidiaries, and the costs of alternative
vehicles for raising capital and debt.  Transactions costs are, however, not zero.  The
costs of arranging separate lines of credit, of managing systems in a way that provides
for separation of the locally incorporated entity, and of meeting the regulatory and
compliance costs of a separate entity are all material additions to the costs of banks
when local incorporation is imposed.
The United States Department of the Treasury and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve (1992) conducted a study on “whether foreign banks should be
required to conduct banking operations in the United States through subsidiaries rather
than branches.”  In unreservedly rejecting the imposition of a subsidiary requirement on
foreign bank operations conducted in the US, the Review concluded that:
“A subsidiary requirement…would impose substantial economic and
financial costs on the US operations of foreign banks.  In fact, a branch of a
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foreign bank is able to operate more efficiently than a separate subsidiary of
a foreign bank due to a number of factors:
1) the ability to deploy capital flexibility;
2) a lower cost of funding;
3) the ability to compete based on access to the worldwide capital
base of its parent;
4) ability to engage in transactions with the home office without
significant operational restrictions; and
5) lower transaction costs.”
In analyzing the likely effect of the policy on efficiency, the Review found that foreign
bank organizational form has important implications for both the amount and
distribution of the bank’s capital and the bank’s management of liquidity and funding.
The organizational form imposed can affect the efficiency with which the capital of the
banking organization is used.  With a branch form capital can be easily be allocated
between the parent and the branch in response to changing growth opportunities.  A
locally incorporated subsidiary is required to hold a certain amount of capital against its
risk-weighted assets, therefore reducing the flexibility of capital deployment.
The US Treasury study found that a requirement to operate through a locally-
incorporated subsidiary may result in a higher overall capital requirement for the
foreign banking organization.  The host country may require the subsidiary to hold
additional capital if the subsidiary is unable to build up a fully diversified portfolio of
risk.  In addition, the home supervisor could also exclude from consolidated capital any
portion of the subsidiary’s capital that is not subordinated to the depositors and general
creditors of the parent bank.11
                                                
11 We note that in the case of Westpac’s branches in New Zealand the Westpac Banking Corporation Act
1982 means that APRA currently treats capital associated with the New Zealand branches as
subordinated to the claims of New Zealand creditors, so local incorporation may not affect thus aspect of
the use and allocation of capital.
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The US Treasury study also found that a subsidiary form is likely to adversely impact
on the cost of wholesale funding, the availability of inter-bank credit lines, and
flexibility in the management of liquidity.  Any other activities of the foreign bank that
rely on leveraging off the parent banks balance sheet will be potentially adversely
affected by a subsidiary requirement.  A branch’s access to funding in wholesale
funding markets and to interbank credit is virtually the same as its parent because the
branch shares the balance sheet of the parent.  A subsidiary, as a separate entity from its
parent, has to operate in the market on its own strength of its own balance sheet which
will necessarily be smaller and less diversified than that of the parent bank.  This will
diminish a subsidiary’s access to wholesale funding sources and interbank credit or
alternatively increase the cost of access to such funds.  The parent has the option of
formally guaranteeing the obligations of the subsidiary but would usually need to back
the guarantee with higher capital requirements in its home country and may have an
impact on its own funding.
The imposition of a subsidiary structure also interferes with the global bank’s optimal
approach to liquidity and funding flexibility.  It is common for a multinational bank to
pursue a centralised approach to liquidity management across the global operations of
the group.  A centralized approach facilitates a more efficient organization of bank
funds, relative to undertaking separate management for each branch and subsidiary.
Under a subsidiary arrangement, a subsidiary must establish its own liquidity
management guidelines and manage its own liquidity needs.  This may result in an
increase in funding costs and reduces the flexibility available to the parent bank to
manage liquidity.
In addition, our analysis of the governance structure imposed by mandatory local
incorporation is that it provides a tangible basis for divergence between the operating
costs of branches and subsidiaries.  Where the governance structure imposed on the
subsidiary is inefficient, either because it provides for a sub-optimal separation of
ownership from control or because of its lack of alignment with the optimal allocation
of functions between Australian and New Zealand offices, then higher funding costs
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will apply to subsidiary operations.  This will be true whether the subsidiary
independently obtains funding through equity or debt markets, or whether the
subsidiary obtains the funding through its parent.  For example, if parent bank
guarantees of the debt of a New Zealand subsidiary are recognised by the market as
being less efficient than a branch structure this will have implications for the cost of the
debt raised by the parent and possibly also for the capital requirements imposed by the
regulator of the parent.  Any increase in capital requirements imposed by the regulator
on this basis would be additional to any funds required because of the change in the
priority status of New Zealand depositors resulting from the global bank guaranteeing
the retail deposit liabilities in New Zealand.
7 International Experience
This section documents the policies of major countries on foreign bank organizational
form.  We conclude that Reserve Bank’s policy marks a significant departure from the
recent international developments in this area.  We then look at some lessons from the
experience of BCCI and the results of a study conducted by the Bank for International
Settlements that warns against the adoption of banking regulation that focuses on
multinational bank failure management.
7.1 Policy on Foreign Bank Organisational Form in Other Countries
All of Australia, Canada, the United States, and the EU allow foreign banks to freely
choose between branching and local incorporation.  The international precedent extends
further than these countries: a survey conducted by the Institute of International
Bankers in September 1995 found that of the forty countries that responded, only two
prohibited the direct branching of foreign banks, Canada and Mexico.  Canada has
since relaxed its policy and allows foreign branching. Further, the trend in recent years
has been towards a relaxation of restrictions on foreign bank organizational form in the
recognition of the benefits it presents to the multinational bank and more widely to the
local financial sector. At the same time, each of these countries have recognized the
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need to protect local depositors and have in some cases prohibited foreign branches
from taking retail deposits or alternatively have compelled the foreign branch to
participate in a local deposit insurance scheme. The approach of international financial
regulators demonstrates that the key issue considered in developing regulations on
foreign bank organizational form has been the assurance of depositor protection.
Implicit in this focus is the recognition that foreign branches do not pose any particular
or unique threat to systemic stability, as claimed by the Reserve Bank.
Australia: Foreign branching by banks into Australia was prohibited until 1992 when
the Federal Government decided to relax the restriction on foreign bank organizational
form.  Up until this time, foreign bank entrants were compelled to incorporate locally.
The local foreign bank subsidiary was required to meet the same requirements of
domestic banks including being subject to capital requirements, and the Reserve Bank
of Australia had the power to take control of its balance sheet in the event of
insolvency.
As a part of its decision in February 1992 to permit foreign banks to establish branch
operations in Australia, the Government determined that “because of the difficulties in
ensuring the same degree of protection for depositors with branches as for those with
locally incorporated banks, branches would be required to confine their deposit-taking
activities to wholesale markets”.12  A foreign branch is not permitted to accept initial
deposits (and other funds) from other sources (individuals and non-corporate
institutions) which are less than $250,000.  Retail deposit taking by foreign banks is
confined to locally incorporated banking subsidiaries.
APRA’s objection to foreign branches accepting retail deposits related to its ability to
take control of the assets of an insolvent foreign branch in the face of potential
challenges to the proper jurisdiction of the bank’s assets between the home and host
countries.  The potential for such challenges has the effect of making the actual level of
                                                
12  Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, Application for a Banking Authority Foreign Bank
Branches, Prudential Statement J2.
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depositor protection uncertain despite Australian depositor preference under the
Banking Act.  As a result, APRA decided that it was not able to provide the same level
of protection to foreign branch depositors as it could in the case of a locally
incorporated entity.  Given its obligations under the Banking Act to protect Australian
depositors, APRA decided to restrict the deposit-taking activities of foreign branches.
Canada: Until 1999 foreign banks wishing to operate in Canada were compelled to
incorporate locally. In 1999 the Canadian government decided to relax the restriction
on foreign bank organizational form following recommendations from the Task Force
on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector, the House of Commons
Standing Committee on Finance and the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade
and Commerce. Two types of foreign branches are permitted – full-service branches
and lending branches. Both branch forms are prohibited from accepting retail deposits,
defined as deposits of less than C$150,000.  Lending branches are in addition not
permitted to accept wholesale deposits, except borrowings from other financial
institutions, and are subject to lower regulatory requirements reflecting the fact that
there are no depositor funds are at risk.
In the case of insolvency of a foreign bank branch in Canada, the separate entity
doctrine applies where the branch is liquidated as if it were a separate legal entity.  All
assets of the foreign bank in Canada, and not just the assets of the branch are available
to meet the claims of Canadian creditors.
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance and the Standing Senate
Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce recommended that the government allow
foreign banks to establish branches in the Canadian financial sector, noting that Canada
was one of the few developed countries that does not permit foreign branching.  The
Senate Committee found that capital and corporate governance requirements imposed
upon foreign bank subsidiaries had deterred foreign bank entry into the Canadian
economy.  They identified several benefits associated with branching including “greater
operational flexibility, increased lending capacity (basing loan size limits on the parent
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bank’s capital), and reduced corporate governance requirements.”  Branching was
found to be more cost-effective for new entrants as compared to the subsidiary form,
thereby encouraging foreign entry.
The Senate Committee supported a restriction on foreign branches taking retail deposits
stating that, there should be “complete protection for the small unsophisticated
depositor; there should be no possibility that a retail depositor would ever have to resort
to a foreign court if he/she ran into problems with a foreign-owned deposit taking
institution.”  The government noted that the foreign branching rules were developed to
increased foreign competition in the banking sector without compromising Canada’s
high standards of depositor protection.
The Taskforce, in recommending foreign branches be permitted, made it clear that their
key concern with organizational form was with depositor protection stating in their
report that where a branch does not engage in retail deposit-taking activities, it should
be subject to the lightest possible regulation.
EU: The Second Banking Directive governs foreign branching between Member States
of the EU. Under the Directive, a single EU banking passport applies where a bank
incorporated in an EU Member State automatically has permission to conduct banking
activities in other Member States through branch or subsidiary form.  The foreign
branch or subsidiary is authorized to accept deposits in the host member country on the
basis of its home country authorization.
The issue of depositor protection is addressed by compelling participation in the home
country’s deposit guarantee scheme. .    This is not the case, however, in the US where
despite the existence of a deposit insurance scheme, foreign branches are not eligible to
participate in the deposit insurance scheme and are not permitted to accept retail
deposits.
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United States: Foreign bank branches are permitted to accept deposits of any size from
foreigners but may only accept deposits in excess of US$100,000 (wholesale deposits)
from US residents.  Foreign branches are not eligible to participate in the federal
deposit insurance scheme. US branches of foreign banks are required to give asset
pledges, a form of minimum capital requirement. Federally licensed branches are
required to maintain a capital equivalency deposit in a Federal Reserve member bank in
the amount of 5% of the branch’s third party liabilities.
7.2 Lessons from the Failure of BCCI
The development of arrangements to deal with the financial difficulty and insolvency of
multinational banks has been given increasing attention in recent years.  The failure of
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. (BCCI) in 1991 highlighted the
complexities and uncertainties associated with the failure of a bank having multiple
subsidiaries and branches across many foreign countries.  Despite the increasing
attention, there is no common international approach to the resolution of failed
multinational banks.
A study group of the Bank for International Settlements released a study in December
1992 which draws on the BCCI experience to highlight the complex issues surrounding
multinational bank failure.  The objective of the study was not to produce specific
policy recommendations but to identify some important implications for banking
supervisors when addressing this issue.
A common theme in the results of the study is that supervisory policies should not
necessarily follow liquidation regimes.  The study group highlights the inherent danger
associated with the development of supervisory policy that focuses on insolvency rather
than the efficiency of the financial sector.
“In some circumstances, gearing supervisory policies rigidly to
liquidation regimes could lead supervisors to adopt policies that are
incompatible with generally appropriate banking policies, particularly for
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healthy banks.  This could result in an inefficient allocation of capital on a
branch-by-branch basis, which would be uneconomic for the industry as a
whole, or complicate the task of supervising multinational banks on a
consolidated basis.” [page 6]
The study group emphasizes the complex nature of effectively developing supervisory
policies in anticipation of multinational bank failure scenarios.  Such policies, in
addition to causing inefficiency and harming the operations of otherwise healthy
foreign banks, may not actually achieve the desired outcomes sought by the regulator.
“In essence it is extraordinarily difficult for supervisors – and for banks – to
identify and manage all the potential risks posed by the intricacies of laws
which might be relevant in the failure of a multinational bank.  Thus,
pursuing policies based on the expectation of certain outcomes in a
liquidation may not be appropriate.” [page 6]
The study points out the fact that determining the location of assets and capital of a
bank operating across multiple international jurisdictions is a very complex legal issue.
There is no single overarching policy solution to resolve the uncertainties associated
with the claims on the assets of a bank across multiple jurisdictions that each have a
unique set of laws governing bank insolvency.  Local incorporation is perhaps an
overly simplistic approach to an intricate and uncertain legal problem.
There are many ways in which a host regulator may attempt to exert increased control
over a foreign bank branch due to insolvency concerns.  The regulator may seek to limit
the flow of assets between the parent and the branch (and between branches) or ring-
fence the branches assets in some other way, for example by compelling local
incorporation.  In examining the alternative forms of supervisory ring-fencing, the
study group warns against the imposition of “overly protective measures” which could
contribute to bringing about the actual insolvency of the branch.
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Bank insolvency is commonly the result of fraud of bank insiders and can result in bank
assets being transferred between jurisdictions and effectively concealed from the reach
of regulators.  The increasing incidence of insider fraud in bank failure highlights the
fundamental importance of effective cross-border banking supervision. The study group
stresses the need for regulators to ensure that foreign banks within their jurisdiction are
properly supervised on a consolidated basis consistent with the principles set out by the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision.  The study identifies adherence to the Basle
Minimum Standards as the principal factor in managing the presence of a foreign bank.
‘The complexities and uncertainties that can result from the liquidation of a
multinational bank’s operations confirm that effective consolidated
supervision performed by home-country supervisors remains paramount in
protecting depositors and other creditors.  Further, these complexities and
uncertainties reinforce the need for host-country supervisors to be satisfied
that banks seeking to enter their markets are supervised by home-country
authorities that perform consolidated supervision, consistent with the
Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups
and their Cross-Border Establishments.” [page 7]
The implications of the BIS study for banking regulators are clear.  Designing bank
supervisory and registration policies with a view to the management of multinational
bank failure is inappropriate, is likely to be ineffective, and can have adverse impacts
on foreign bank efficiency.  The policy proposed by the RBNZ seeks to implement
supervisory policy which is primarily motivated by liquidation regimes and
multinational bank failure scenarios.  The policy is therefore contrary to the study
group’s approach.  Rather the focus of banking regulators should be on compliance
with the Basle Committee Minimum Standards ensuring effective supervision of
foreign bank activities on a consolidated basis and increased cooperation among bank
regulators.
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The limited international developments in this area to date have focused on initiatives
to achieve cooperation among banking regulators in the light of their differing legal
systems.  Although the formation of a global international convention on dealing with
the insolvency of a multinational bank is not likely in the short term, cooperation is
possible on a more limited scale between groups of countries.  An example is the
European Convention on Insolvency Procedures which was adopted in Europe in 1995.
The development of a formal agreement between Australia and New Zealand is likely
to be the most effective way of ensuring that the resolution of a failed multinational
bank takes place in an efficient and organized fashion in the interests of systemic
stability and Australian and New Zealand depositors.
8 Alternatives to local incorporation
Westpac has already put forward some alternatives to local incorporation, including a
test to assist in determining which assets fall under the jurisdiction of the New Zealand
statutory manager (see memo from WestpacTrust to RBNZ dated 26 July 2001).
Westpac proposed that a purposive test would resolve ambiguity where an asset would
be treated as being an asset in New Zealand if and only if a person with authority to act
for Westpac in New Zealand but not elsewhere would have effective control of the
asset, and would be able to realize it for the benefit of creditors in New Zealand.  We
consider the purposive approach to be flawed if the objective is to achieve a quick
resolution of the bank’s affairs.  The test of effective control is difficult to apply in
practice and would be likely to attract extensive litigation from the parent/APRA.
Another alternative to the purposive test is to specify in legislation exactly which assets
will be taken to be assets in NZ.  The difficulty with this approach is that financial
products are constantly changing and evolving, making precise definition a problem.
Again, this approach is likely to attract litigation from the parent/APRA.
In this section we consider a number of alternatives to local incorporation, assessing
both their impact on efficiency and their ability to meet the concerns of the RBNZ.  We
have identified five options for consideration:
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·  Market-based approach relying on disclosure;
·  Branch asset requirements;
·  Contractual alteration of depositor preference arrangements;
·  Establishment of a formal deposit insurance regime; and
·  Establishment of a trust in which the New Zealand assets of WestpacTrust would be
held.
We consider each of these alternatives in turn.
8.1 Market-based approach: disclosure
The RBNZ’s policy on local incorporation is logically inconsistent with its current
approach to the regulation of financial institutions.  This is because the RBNZ’s current
regulatory policy is focused on disclosure on depositor monitoring rather than on active
regulatory direction of institutional conduct.  The need for a policy of local
incorporation rests at least in part on the suggestion that depositors may not be aware
of, or may not be able to assess the risk associated with, a branch of a foreign bank as
opposed to a locally incorporated subsidiary.
A policy alternative that is internally consistent with the Reserve Bank’s regulatory
framework, is to allow an informed market determine the optimal foreign bank
organizational form.  Under this proposal, the Reserve Bank would compel Westpac
Banking Corporation to inform New Zealand depositors of the legal implications of
their status as depositors at a branch of an Australian bank. Depositors would then be in
a position to make a more informed decision whether to deposit their funds with
WestpacTrust or a locally incorporated financial institution. Market forces would then
dictate whether it is optimal for Westpac to locally incorporate in New Zealand.
It could be argued that such an announcement may have the potential to destabilize the
banking system and therefore create the very problem that the Reserve Bank is seeking
to avoid. However, the same argument could be made more generally in reference to
the Reserve Bank’s entire regulatory approach that relies on the maximization of
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information flows to market participants, in preference to a more interventionist
approach. Moreover, if we accept that the use of market information is an appropriate
approach to prudential regulation, then it would be consistent to accept that the market
is already aware of Westpac’s branch status (if for no other reason than the
development of the RBNZA’s local incorporation policy).  Disclosure is therefore
likely to be a much less intrusive option than forcing local incorporation, is consistent
with the current policy approach of the Reserve Bank, and would eliminate the current
inefficiency driven information asymmetry facing New Zealand depositors.
8.2 Branch asset requirements
One of the main arguments put forward by the RBNZ for local incorporation is that it
ring-fences the assets of the branch and makes it easier for a statutory manager to deal
with the foreign bank.  The Reserve Bank has tended to focus on the current difficulties
associated with applying the Bank Creditor Recapitalisation (BCR) approach to a
foreign branch that has no balance sheet of its own.  However, other regulatory
authorities have preferred alternative approaches.
A study undertaken by the US Department of Treasury and the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve (1992) examining the merits of a subsidiary reached the conclusion
that compelling local incorporation is an inefficient approach to dealing with the
financial difficulties of foreign bank branches.  They found that alternative measures
that can be applied on a case by case basis, for example, asset maintenance
requirements and restrictions on transactions between a branch and its foreign parent
(and other branches), that effectively ring-fence the activities of a foreign branch
without imposing “the unnecessary costs and inefficiencies associated with a broader
subsidiary requirement”.13
US supervisory authorities have the power to impose asset maintenance requirements
upon a branch of a foreign bank that is experiencing financial weakness.  Asset
                                                
13  Page 3.
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maintenance restrictions were originally developed as a method of ensuring that, in the
event of a liquidation, sufficient assets would be available to effect repayment to
depositors and liability holders of the US branch.14  Asset maintenance involves the
foreign branch maintaining a prescribed level of eligible assets sufficient to cover a
specified percentage of the branch’s third party liabilities.15  In this way, a branch under
asset maintenance possesses some of the characteristics of a locally incorporated
subsidiary.  Branches are required to maintain specific records and periodically report
asset maintenance compliance to the regulator.  The benefit of asset maintenance is that
it is applied only on a case-by-case basis, and does not affect the operations of healthy
foreign banks.
Other methods available to US regulators that can be applied on a case by case basis to
a foreign branch include: asset pledge requirements, increased capital equivalency
deposits, restrictions on transactions with related parties, funding limitations, growth
limitations, and voluntary or involuntary termination of the branch.16
In addition to having a variety of mechanisms to deal with the financial difficulties of
solvent foreign branches, the US law is equally able to deal with the actual insolvency
of a foreign branch.  The US regulator is authorized to appoint a receiver where a
branch is critically undercapitalized or has become insolvent.  In the case that the
branch is insolvent, the single-entity doctrine is applied where the branch is treated as a
separately incorporated legal entity the purposes of the liquidation.    The receiver has
the power to take possession of not only all of the assets of the foreign branch but any
additional assets of the foreign bank located in the US.  There is a preference for the
claims of US depositors and other creditors that have arisen from transactions with the
foreign branch and the liquidator of the foreign bank is prohibited from paying any
claims that would not represent an enforceable legal obligation against the branch if it
were a locally incorporated subsidiary.  US depositors benefit in that the entire assets of
                                                
14  Asset maintenance paper, Section 5020.1, page 1.
15  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Examination Manual for US Branches and Agencies of
Foreign Banking Organisations, September 1997, Section 5020.1, page 1.
16  Ibid, Section 2040.1, page 2.
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the foreign bank located in the US are available to meet their claims and there are
controls on the payout of claims that would not be considered arms length under a
subsidiary form.
On the issue of foreign branch insolvency, the US study concluded that, the event of an
insolvency of a foreign branch in the US, US depositors would be treated in much the
same manner as depositor of a locally incorporated entity.  In both cases, US depositors
have claims on the assets under the jurisdiction of the US liquidator.  A creditor of a
branch, however, would potentially have access to the assets of the foreign parent in
other jurisdictions outside the US.  Depositors in a locally incorporated entity would
not have such a claim, in the absence of a legal or factual basis to pierce the corporate
veil.17  This access to the worldwide assets of the multinational bank was recognized as
a crucial factor against imposing local incorporation in the report of the
Superintendents Advisory Committee on Transnational Banking Institutions.18
The US experience demonstrates that there are alternative ways of dealing with the
management of financial difficulties experienced by solvent foreign branches on a case-
by-case basis that should be fully considered by the Reserve Bank as viable and more
efficient alternatives to imposing local incorporation.  In relation to managing the actual
insolvency of a foreign branch, the US study not only concluded that US depositors
would not be worse off as compared to depositors in a locally incorporated subsidiary,
but that access to the worldwide asset base of the parent favoured branch depositors.
8.3 Alter depositor preference arrangements
To raise the status of WestpacTrust depositors to be equivalent to that of Australian
depositors, Westpac Banking Corporation could enter into private contracts with New
Zealand depositors conferring claims on assets of the Australian bank pari passu  with
                                                
17  Appendix E, page 1.
18  Subsidiary Requirements Study, App E page 5.
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Australian depositors.  This would relieve the concerns of the RBNZ with respect to the
depositor preference arrangements in the Australian Banking Act.
However, there are issues regarding the enforceability of such a contract.  The Banking
Act 1959 provides that Australian depositors have preference in their claims on the
Australian assets of the bank.  The private contracts made by Westpac would directly
conflict with s 13A(3) of the Banking Act.  In the event of such a conflict, the
provisions of the Act would prevail.  Therefore, despite the existence of the contracts, a
liquidator would be obliged to meet the claims of Australian depositors in preference to
New Zealand depositors.  Westpac’s contractual promise to New Zealand depositors
would be unenforceable.  In order for New Zealand depositors to be ranked pari passu
with Australian depositors, s 13A(3) of the Banking Act would need to be repealed.
The next best solution from the perspective of New Zealand depositors would be to
provide them with preference over the remaining assets of the Australian bank and any
foreign assets after the claims of Australian depositors have been met.  Such a contract
between Westpac and its New Zealand depositors is likely to be enforceable, but
presents problems of its own.  Firstly, there is no guarantee that there will be sufficient
assets remaining to meet the claims of New Zealand depositors.  Secondly, this type of
arrangement would act to subordinate the claims of other bank creditors, for example
interbank and wholesale customers.  The likely effect would be that Westpac would
face a higher cost of funding from these parties.
8.4 Deposit insurance scheme
An alternative to local incorporation that would relieve the need to deal with depositor
preference in the home country is the establishment of a local deposit insurance
scheme.  Such a scheme would act to secure the funds of depositors in foreign
branches.  Both domestic and foreign banks would be required to contribute to the local
deposit insurance scheme, and in the event of the failure of the foreign bank, local
depositors would be secured.
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This alternative is mentioned for completeness rather than as a serious policy
alternative to address the Reserve Bank’s current concerns.  The introduction of a
deposit insurance scheme in the New Zealand financial sector is clearly outside the
current regulatory approach of the Reserve Bank, and difficult to justify on any grounds
related to economic efficiency.
8.5 A Trust Structure
Westpac’s New Zealand operations could be reorganized under a trust structure.
Westpac Banking Corporation would act as the trustee and the depositors of the bank
would become unit holders in the trust.  One of the key benefits of a trust structure is
that it will address the Reserve Bank’s concerns about the ring-fencing of the assets of
the foreign bank.  Additionally, the trust would not be required to be separately
capitalized so would be a more efficient vehicle to ring-fence foreign bank assets
compared to a local subsidiary.
We note this alternative option without having fully explored its implications or
practicality in legal terms.
9 Conclusion
WestpacTrust is the brand used for the New Zealand retail branches of Westpac
Banking Corporation. The RBNZ has claimed that in the event of the failure of an
Australian bank with branches in New Zealand there is both significant legal
uncertainty about the assets that would be available to pay New Zealand depositors and
significant risk that Australian directors will breach their legal obligations in New
Zealand to shift assets to Australia.  In either case, given the depositor protection
provisions of the Australian Banking Act, New Zealand depositors may be
disadvantaged.  The RBNZ has introduced a policy requiring local incorporation of the
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New Zealand operations of systemically-important foreign banks, claiming that this
policy will materially reduce the risks faced by New Zealand depositors of foreign
banks.
The local incorporation policy confuses systemic stability (the claimed basis of the
RBNZ policy) with protection of retail depositors (the primary rationale for local
incorporation in other jurisdictions).  If local incorporation is a depositor protection
policy, and is based on the notion that depositors cannot assess the risk of placing
deposits with the local branches of Australian banks, then is it conceptually inconsistent
with existing RBNZ policy focusing on disclosure and depositor monitoring as the
primary basis for prudential regulation.
The international literature on branches and local incorporation reaches conclusions
that are inconsistent with the RBNZ policy.  The trend internationally has been to relax
restrictions on foreign branching, with regulatory concerns being focused on depositor
protection rather than systemic stability.
On the evidence available to us, it appears that the RBNZ has considered the benefits
associated with local incorporation in the event that they need to manage the failure of
an Australian bank, but have given insufficient weight to the efficiency losses resulting
from the impact of local incorporation on the governance structure and operations of
the banks in New Zealand as well as the security for depositors in the event that the
local subsidiary fails. Requiring that Westpac incorporate in New Zealand (and that
other banks retain local incorporation) may result in substantial efficiency losses and
provide no reduction in the likelihood of loss to New Zealand depositors following
insolvency.
There is strong evidence that with modern technology the branch structure represents
the most efficient means of operating the New Zealand business of the Australian
banks.  A local board represents an inappropriate and costly governance structure for
the operations of Westpac (and other Australian banks) in New Zealand.  Local
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incorporation may make New Zealand depositors worse of by exposing them to
insolvency risk of the New Zealand operations of Westpac and removing the security of
the global balance sheet of Westpac that they currently enjoy.  Local incorporation,
combined with the policies of foreign regulators such as APRA, substantially increases
the likelihood that in the event of the insolvency of the local bank its parent will not
ensure payment in full for the New Zealand depositors.
The Reserve Bank’s proposal is inconsistent with its existing approach to correcting
market failure in the financial sector through reliance on market discipline. The
preferred option in keeping with this approach should be on informing New Zealand
depositors of the unsecured status of their deposits in Westpac and allowing market
forces to determine the most efficient organizational form for WestpacTrust. This
policy option will address any existing information asymmetries without penalizing the
operations of healthy foreign branches.  In the longer term, if the Reserve Bank remains
concerned with the implications of the depositor protection provisions of the Australian
Banking Act, it must pursue co-operative solutions with Australian politicians and
regulators that do not involve reducing the efficiency of the New Zealand banking
system.
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